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The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and
neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss
promising research avenues.
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Introduction
Consciousness is subjective experience, the “what it is like” to
perceive a scene, recognize a face, hear a sound, or reflect on the
experience itself (Tononi et al., 2016a). Identifying the neural
correlates of consciousness is important scientifically and clini-
cally, to improve the detection of awareness and to design new
therapies in patients who remain unresponsive after brain dam-
age (Gosseries et al., 2014). Although frontal cortex is crucial for
intelligent behavior and cognitive control, its involvement in
consciousness remains a matter of debate (Koch et al., 2016a). It
has been widely assumed that prefrontal circuits are essential for
consciousness, either alone (Del Cul et al., 2009) or in conjunc-
tion with parietal areas (frontoparietal network) (Bor and Seth,
2012; Laureys and Schiff, 2012). In this Perspective, we will crit-
ically review the evidence for the role of the “front” versus the
“back” of the cortex in supporting consciousness. By the “front,”
we refer to prerolandic neocortex, including dorsolateral, medial
prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and orbitofrontal areas. By the
“back,” we refer to neocortical regions within the parietal, occip-
ital, and lateral temporal lobes. Due to space constraints, we will
not review possible contributions to consciousness of the medial
temporal lobe and of the insular cortex (Craig, 2010; Seth et al.,
2011; Quiroga, 2012), except for pointing out that consciousness
is preserved after bilateral lesions of these areas (Corkin, 2002;
Damasio et al., 2013). We will also not discuss the essential role of
different brainstem and subcortical mesocircuit structures in
regulating the level of consciousness (Brown et al., 2010). We
emphasize, however, that consciousness is absent in vegetative
state (VS) patients who suffered widespread corticothalamic
damage even when brainstem activity is preserved (Laureys et al.,
2004). We refer to other reviews for the complex interplay between
consciousness, memory, and attention (Tononi et al., 2016b;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2016), including spatial neglect (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2011). Finally, we will focus on the empirical evidence
about the role of the front and the back of cortex leaving aside
theoretical interpretations and predictions (Lamme, 2006; De-
haene and Changeux, 2011; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Boly and
Seth, 2012; Tononi et al., 2016a).
Distinguishing between the neural correlates of
consciousness and other neural processes
Neural correlates of consciousness: definition
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are defined as the
minimal neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one con-
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scious percept (Crick and Koch, 1990). Content-specific NCC
are the neural mechanisms specifying particular phenomenal
contents within consciousness, such as colors, faces, places, or
thoughts. Experimentally, content-specific NCC are typically in-
vestigated by comparing conditions where specific conscious
contents are present versus absent. The full NCC can be defined
as the union of all content-specific NCC (Koch et al., 2016a).
Experimentally, the full NCC can be identified by comparing
conditions where consciousness as a whole is present versus ab-
sent, such as dreaming versus dreamless sleep. In principle, the
full NCC can also be approximated by sampling the wide range of
content-specific NCC. In practice, these two approaches progress
hand in hand (Boly et al., 2013).
Distilling the “true NCC”
Recent results have stressed the importance of dissociating the
true NCC from other neural processes (Miller, 2007; de Graaf et
al., 2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2015) that can be considered as “prereq-
uisites” and “consequences” of consciousness (Aru et al., 2012) or
alternatively as preceding and following the experience itself
(Pitts et al., 2014). Here, factors that modulate the NCC without
being directly involved in specifying conscious contents will be
called “background conditions” (Koch et al., 2016a) of several
kinds (Fig. 1). For example, global enabling factors, such as blood
flow or oxygen supply to the cortex, are obviously essential for
consciousness, but they do not contribute directly to its contents.
Similarly, neuronal activating systems, such as cholinergic and
noradrenergic neuromodulation, diffuse thalamocortical projec-
tions, and the anterior forebrain mesocircuit, are likely to influ-
ence the level of consciousness only indirectly, by modulating the
activity of large parts of the full NCC (Schiff, 2010; de Graaf and
Sack, 2014). Processing loops involving selective attention, work-
ing memory, or expectation may also modulate the probability of
specific conscious contents indirectly, by modifying the excitabil-
ity of content-specific NCC in a task-dependent manner (Aru et
al., 2012) concurrently with experience (Postle, 2015; Tononi et
al., 2016a). Finally, specific contents of experience are specified
by the cortical NCC whether they are induced by sensory stimuli,
imagined, or dreamt, suggesting that neural activity along sen-
sory pathways serves as a reliable but indirect trigger of experien-
tial content, rather than contributing directly to it. Similarly,
neural activity along motor pathways is essential for reporting
the contents of consciousness, but not for experiencing them
(Tsuchiya et al., 2015).
Several complementary methods can be used to distill the true
NCC. For the full NCC, within-state paradigms can be used to
avoid confounds due to changes in behavioral state and task
performance as well as to dissociate unconsciousness from unre-
sponsiveness. For example, within either non-rapid eye move-
ment (NREM) or REM sleep one can contrast neural activity
when subjects report having dreamt (60% of cases in NREM
sleep, 95% of cases in REM sleep) versus having been uncon-
scious. Patients can also be conscious, although unresponsive and
disconnected from the environment, in 20% of cases during
anesthesia (Sanders et al., 2012) and in 35% of cases during
complex partial seizures (Johanson et al., 2003). In such cases,
methods assessing the complexity of neural EEG responses to
transcranial magnetic stimulation can be used to assess the pres-
ence versus absence of consciousness in unresponsive subjects
(Casarotto et al., 2016). For content-specific NCC, experiments
can be carefully designed to systematically investigate possible
dissociations between the experience of particular conscious con-
tents and the engagement of various cognitive processes, such as
attention, decision-making, and reporting (Aru et al., 2012; Koch
and Tsuchiya, 2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Tsuchiya and Koch,
2016). It is especially important to assess the association between
the activity of a candidate NCC and the presence of a particular
conscious content systematically, across a large number of differ-
ent experiments (Crick and Koch, 1990). Machine learning ap-
proaches can also be used to identify the true NCC as the neural
activity patterns most predictive for specific conscious percepts
(Sandberg et al., 2014). Ideally, dissociation, association, and pre-
diction approaches applied to lesion, stimulation, and recording
studies will converge in identifying a reliable and specific content-
specific NCC (Koch et al., 2016a). In that case, one should assume
Figure 1. Definition of the NCC. Content-specific NCC (red) directly contribute to phenomenal distinctions (e.g., low-level visual features, faces, or places) within consciousness. The full NCC
(orange) is constituted by the union of all the content-specific NCC. Background conditions to the NCC encompass neural processes that enable or modulate the activity of the full NCC and thus
influence the level of consciousness (green), including global enabling factors, such as blood flow or oxygen supply, and neuronal activating systems, such as brainstem reticular formation; neural
processes that modulate the activity of only some content-specific NCC, including processing loops involving attention or working memory (beige), sensory pathways activating primary sensory
cortices (pink), andoutputs from theNCC (blue) involved in task-related verbal ormotor reports. V1, Primary visual cortex; V2, secondary visual cortex; PPA, parahippocampal place area;M1, primary
motor cortex.
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operationally that the relevant part of the brain contributes di-
rectly to consciousness: that is, it constitutes a part of its physical
substrate (Tononi et al., 2016a). With these methodological clar-
ifications at hand, we will now critically review evidence for the
NCC in the front versus the back of the cerebral cortex.
Clinical evidence for a contribution of anterior versus
posterior cortex to consciousness
Lesions
Lesion data offer strong causal evidence for the involvement or
lack of involvement of different brain areas in supporting con-
sciousness and its contents (Farah, 2004). With regards to the full
NCC, several well-documented patients have been described
with a normal level of consciousness after extensive frontal dam-
age. For example, Patient A (Brickner, 1952) (Fig. 2A), after ex-
tensive surgical removal of the frontal lobes bilaterally, including
Brodmann areas 8 –12, 16, 24, 32, 33, and
45– 47, sparing only area 6 and Broca’s
area (Brickner, 1936), “toured the Neuro-
logical Institute in a party of five, two of
whom were distinguished neurologists,
and none of them noticed anything un-
usual until their attention was especially
called to A after the passage of more than
an hour.” Patient KM (Hebb and Pen-
field, 1940) had a near-complete bilateral
prefrontal resection for epilepsy surgery
(includingbilateralBrodmannareas9–12,32,
and 45– 47), after which his IQ improved.
Patients undergoing bilateral resection of
prefrontal cortical areas for psychosur-
gery (Mettler et al., 1949), including
Brodmann areas 10, 11, 45, 46, 47, or 8, 9,
10, or 44, 45, 46, 10, or area 24 (ventral
anterior cingulate), remained fully con-
scious (see also Penfield and Jasper, 1954;
Kozuch, 2014; Tononi et al., 2016b). A
young man who had fallen on an iron
spike that completely penetrated both
frontal lobes, affecting bilateral Brod-
mann areas 10, 11, 24, 25, 32, and 45– 47,
and areas 44 and 6 on the right side, went
on to marry, raise two children, have a
professional life, and never complained
of perceptual or other deficits (Mataro´ et
al., 2001). A young woman with massive
bilateral prefrontal damage of unclear eti-
ology, affecting the right basal, superior,
medial and lateral PFC, and the left medial
orbitofrontal, frontopolar, and frontal
gyri (Markowitsch and Kessler, 2000), had
deficits in cognitive functions supported
by the frontal lobe, but her consciousness
and perceptual abilities were preserved.
Medial prefrontal lesions, especially those
involving anterior cingulate cortex, can
cause akinetic mutism (Cairns et al.,
1941), where patients visually track exam-
iners but do not respond to command.
Patients who recover from this state typi-
cally report that they were conscious but
lacked the motivation to respond (Dama-
sio and Van Hoesen, 1983).
Moving to the back of the brain, broad
bilateral lesions or ablations of posterior cortex are extremely rare
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). However, traumatic lesions of the
posterior corpus callosum, connecting large parts of the posterior
cortex, are found in 98% of patients who remain in VS after 1 year
(Kampfl et al., 1998) (Fig. 2B). Moreover, such lesions are asso-
ciated with a 214-fold risk of permanent VS (Kampfl et al., 1998).
Posterior corpus callosum lesions also predict permanent
coma after cardiac arrest (Bianchi and Sims, 2008) (Fig. 2C). By
contrast, traumatic lesions of the frontal lobe, which are found in
approximately half of patients with traumatic VS in the acute
phase, do not predict outcome (Kampfl et al., 1998).
With regards to content-specific NCC, there is abundant neu-
rological evidence that lesions in the posterior cortex can cause a
loss of specific contents of experience (Farah, 2004). For example,
lesions of the right fusiform face area (FFA) cause prosopagnosia,
Figure 2. Clinical evidence. Full NCC. A, Complete bilateral prefrontal lobectomy does not noticeably change the level of
consciousness. Top row, Bilateral views of the resected left and right frontal lobes (Brickner, 1936). Bottom row, Postmortem
lateral views of both hemispheres (Brickner, 1952).B, Anoxic lesions of posterior corpus callosumpredict permanent VS after head
trauma (Kampfl et al., 1998). C, Lesions of posterior corpus callosum, with restricted diffusion extending to parieto-temporo-
occipital regions, predict permanent coma after anoxic brain damage (Bianchi and Sims, 2008). Content-specific NCC. D, A recent
study suggests that intrusive thoughts can be elicited by electrical stimulation of anterior cingulate cortex (Popa et al., 2016).
Eliciting any experience is, however, farmore commonwhen stimulating posterior than anterior cortical structures (Selimbeyoglu
and Parvizi, 2010). E, F, Direct electrical brain stimulation (DES) supports a causal role for different parts of the posterior cortex in
specifying conscious content, for example, the right FFA in contributing to face percepts (Rangarajan et al., 2014) (E) and the
parietal cortex contributing the feeling of intention to move (F ) (Desmurget et al., 2013). SF, Superior frontal sulcus; MF, middle
frontal sulcus; IF, inferior frontal sulcus; DWI, diffusion weighted imaging.
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an inability to recognize faces (Barton and Cherkasova, 2003).
Lesions of inferolateral occipital cortex cause achromatopsia, an
inability to distinguish colors (Barton, 2011) that, when severe,
can be accompanied by unawareness of the deficit (von Arx et al.,
2010). Other lesions of the occipital cortex lead to visual form
agnosia, a selective inability to identify objects, or simultanagno-
sia, an inability to perceive more than one object at a time (Farah,
2004). Lesions of the postrolandic cortex lead to a loss of somato-
sensory percepts, and lesions of left and right angular gyrus
impair the conscious understanding of speech and prosody,
respectively (George et al., 1996), whereas lesions of the infe-
rior parietal lobule cause a loss of motor awareness (Sirigu et
al., 2004). Lesions in left lateral temporal cortex may also lead
to selective deficits for the perception of single words or full
sentences (Blumenfeld, 2011).
By contrast, there is little evidence for loss of specific con-
scious contents after frontal damage (Penfield and Jasper, 1954).
For example, lesions of Broca’s area, while impairing speech pro-
duction, do not typically cause loss of conscious speech percep-
tion (Blumenfeld, 2011). Although frontal injuries can slightly
increase the threshold for perceiving some brief (16 ms) and
masked visual stimuli, patients still experience them (Del Cul et
al., 2009), suggesting that these frontal regions may modulate the
NCC (i.e., act as background conditions) rather than contribut-
ing directly to consciousness (Kozuch, 2014).
Stimulation studies
Electrical stimulation during neurosurgery is an important source of
evidence for a direct contribution of different brain areas to con-
sciousness (Penfield, 1959; Desmurget et al., 2013), as indicated
by its superior value in predicting postoperative deficits com-
pared with fMRI or diffusion tensor imaging (Borchers et al.,
2011).
With regards to the full NCC, the classical study of Moruzzi
and Magoun (1949) and subsequent studies showed that it is
possible to restore EEG activation and behavior in anesthetized
animals through electrical or pharmacological stimulation of
neuronal activating systems in brainstem, thalamus, and basal
forebrain. Recently, subcortical electrical stimulation has also
succeeded in increasing the level of consciousness in animals with
focal seizures (Kundishora et al., 2017) and in human patients
after brain damage (Schiff et al., 2007). In these cases, it is likely
that the effects were mediated indirectly, by modulating the ex-
citability of the full NCC through arousal systems.
With regards to content-specific NCC, it was recognized long
ago that electrical stimulation of most of the frontal cortex does
not elicit content-specific changes in experience (Penfield and
Jasper, 1954), although it can interfere with task execution and
induce involuntary movements (Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi, 2010).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the frontal cortex also does
not seem to modify experiential content, although it can interfere
with speech production (Pascual-Leone et al., 1991). Complex
hallucinations, similar to those classically reported after stimu-
lation of temporal and parahippocampal regions (Penfield and
Jasper, 1954; Me´gevand et al., 2014), have been occasionally re-
ported after stimulation of the middle and inferior frontal
gyrus (Blanke et al., 2000), perhaps due to a network effect. Re-
cently, however, two case report studies described the occurrence
of a will to persevere and of intrusive thoughts after stimulation
of the anterior cingulate cortex (Parvizi et al., 2013) and of mid-
cingulate cortex (Popa et al., 2016) (Fig. 2D), respectively.
Electrical stimulation of posterior cortex induces discrete
changes in the contents of consciousness more reliably (Selimbe-
yoglu and Parvizi, 2010), although some posteromedial cortical
areas may remain silent (Foster and Parvizi, 2017). For example,
direct electrical stimulation of early visual areas induces simple
visual experiences, such as phosphenes (Beauchamp et al., 2012;
Winawer and Parvizi, 2016), which can also be induced by trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation of occipital and parietal cortices
(Samaha et al., 2017). Electrical stimulation of postcentral gyrus
induces somatosensory percepts (Penfield and Jasper, 1954),
stimulation of temporoparietal cortex induces experiences of vi-
sual motion (Rauschecker et al., 2011), while stimulation of right
fusiform gyrus selectively disrupts the perception of faces (Ran-
garajan et al., 2014) (Fig. 2E). Moreover, the feeling of intention
has been elicited in temporoparietal cortex (Desmurget et al.,
2009) (Fig. 2F) and out-of-body experiences in the right angular
gyrus (Blanke et al., 2002).
Together, stimulation studies support the idea that some pos-
terior cortical regions may contribute directly to specific contents
of experience, but the evidence for prefrontal regions is scarce
and indirect.
Neuroimaging evidence for a contribution of the anterior
versus posterior cortex to consciousness
Compared with lesions or electrical stimulations, neuroimaging
studies offer less direct evidence for the contribution of any one
brain region to consciousness (Farah, 2004). Indeed, functional
activation maps frequently encompass brain areas that may not
be directly involved in specifying experiential contents (Silvanto
and Pascual-Leone, 2012; de Graaf and Sack, 2014). For example,
whereas fMRI and intracranial EEG both reveal the activation of
widespread bilateral temporo-occipital areas (beyond the FFA)
after the presentation of faces, direct electrical stimulation dis-
rupts face perception only when applied to the right FFA (Ran-
garajan et al., 2014) (Fig. 2E).
However, neuroimaging experiments can sample brain activ-
ity systematically and noninvasively in healthy volunteers (Pol-
drack and Farah, 2015) and, with appropriate methodologies,
they can also provide valuable information about the functional
specificity of brain regions (Moran and Zaki, 2013; Poldrack and
Farah, 2015). For example, neuroimaging experiments can dem-
onstrate dissociations between content-specific NCC and neural
correlates of other cognitive processes (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf
et al., 2012) by relying on forward inference (Henson, 2006; Mo-
ran and Zaki, 2013). Moreover, ever-growing neuroimaging da-
tabases can demonstrate systematic associations between specific
conscious contents and the activation of specific cortical areas by
using meta-analytic reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006; Yarkoni et
al., 2010; Moran and Zaki, 2013; Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016).
Also, multivariate decoding techniques can compare the predic-
tive value of various NCC candidates for specific conscious per-
cepts (Haynes, 2009; Sandberg et al., 2014).
Forward inference: dissociating the true NCC from correlated
neural processes
As was argued above, the cleanest way to identify the full NCC is
to use within-state, no-task paradigms (Fig. 3A–D), which avoid
confounds due to behavioral state changes and dissociate conscious-
ness from behavioral responsiveness and task performance. Within-
state studies contrasting dreaming versus nondreaming during
NREM sleep and REM sleep have pointed to a “posterior hot
zone” in parieto-occipital areas, possibly extending to mid-
cingulate regions, as a reliable NCC (Siclari et al., 2017). Within-
state contrasts applied to brain-damaged patients, comparing VS
to minimally conscious state (MCS), also reveal most consistent
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differences within posterior cortex (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010;
King et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2015).
With regards to content-specific NCC, many experiments us-
ing bistable perception and masking paradigms have shown the
activation of prefrontal areas during conscious perception of ex-
ternal stimuli (for a detailed review, see Dehaene and Changeux,
2011). However, these task-based paradigms recruit areas in-
volved in attention, working memory, and other cognitive
processes. If these areas are only required for reporting on the
perceived stimuli and not for experiencing them, they should not
be regarded as a part of the full NCC (Tsuchiya et al., 2015). The
recent study of stimuli that are task irrelevant but experienced
(Fig. 3E–L) has made it possible to dissociate the true NCC from
various cognitive functions involved in behavioral demands (Aru
et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). During both inattentional
blindness (Pitts et al., 2012) and backward masking experiments
(Pitts et al., 2014), the content-specific NCC for task-irrelevant
percepts are located in posterior cortex, whereas a difference in
frontal activity (P3 potential) is only present if stimuli are task-
relevant. “No-report” paradigms have also pointed to posterior
regions as the NCC, whereas frontal cortex activation is corre-
lated with reporting (Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Koch et al., 2016a).
Similar dissociations have been identified by orthogonally ma-
nipulating consciousness versus selective attention (Tsuchiya
and Koch, 2016), working memory (King et al., 2016), or expec-
tation (Melloni et al., 2011). During REM sleep, a “no-task” state,
specific dream contents, such as faces, places, movement, and
speech, can be predicted from posterior, but not anterior, cortex
(Siclari et al., 2017). The same approach has highlighted a poten-
tial contribution of mid-cingulate cortex to conscious thought,
whether during waking, NREM, or REM sleep (Perogamvros et
al., 2017). Finally, when meditation practitioners become im-
mersed in a state of vivid imagery, activity in their frontal lobe
decreases (Lou et al., 1999).
Reverse inference: content-specific NCC versus
non–content-specific cognitive processes
In neuroimaging studies, a content-specific NCC can be charac-
terized as the part of the brain in which a change in activity
reliably and specifically predicts a particular change in experien-
tial content. In recent years, several open-access frameworks have
been developed to pool data from thousands of neuroimaging
studies and assess reliability and specificity (Eickhoff et al., 2011;
Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016). For example, the Neurosynth
framework (www.neurosynth.org) (Yarkoni et al., 2011) com-
bines an automated tool to extract activation coordinates with
a taxonomy of cognitive processes. Despite significant caveats,
such as the use of 3D coordinates of activity peaks rather than
unthresholded statistical maps (but see Neurovault, www.
neurovault.org) (Gorgolewski et al., 2016) and of functional la-
bels assigned by investigators, these meta-analytic tools can al-
ready illustrate reverse inference and generate hypotheses. For
example, in a traditional meta-analysis approach, computing the
probability that different brain regions are active when the study
Figure 3. Neuroimaging, Forward inference. Full NCC. A, Between-state paradigm contrasting brain activity during NREM sleep and wakefulness (Kajimura et al., 1999) shows a relative
deactivation of frontoparietal cortices. B, When subjects are awoken from NREM sleep and asked if they experienced anything before being awakened, EEG data during dream experiences show
reduced low-frequency activity (1–10 Hz) comparedwith dreamless sleep in a posterior parieto-occiptal “hot zone” (Siclari et al., 2014). C,D, Directly comparing patients in anMCSwith patients in
a VS reveals differences in connectivity restricted to posterior cortex. C, Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2010). D, Wu et al. (2015). Content-specific NCC. E, F, Tasks involving reporting seen versus unseen
stimuli highlight differences in frontoparietal cortices:E, Binocular rivalry (Lumer et al., 1998);F, Visualwordmasking tasks (Dehaene et al., 2001).G,When conscious visual perception is dissociated
from behavior (i.e., button press), only differences in activity in occipital and parietal regions remain (Fra¨ssle et al., 2014). H, Conscious perception of weak somatosensory stimuli correlates with
cortical changes in BOLD signal restricted to contralateral rolandic and parietal areas (Meador et al., 2017). I, J, An early “visual awareness negativity”200ms in posterior temporal and occipital
areas is found in two masking paradigms: I, Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010); J, Andersen et al. (2016). C, Conscious stimulus; UC, unconscious stimulus. K, Visual one-back paradigm in patients
implanted with subdural electrode arrays. The visual cortex (right of the dashed white line) responds rapidly to the seen stimulus (red), whereas frontal regions are modulated by the task (yellow)
(Noy et al., 2015). L, A within-state no-task experiment (Fig. 1D), contrasting EEG activity during REM sleep dreams with and without faces, highlighted the fusiform gyrus as content-specific NCC
(Siclari et al., 2014).
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topics include consciousness, Neurosynth activation maps dis-
play some parts of the frontal cortex (Fig. 4A). However, in a
reverse inference mode, computing the probability that con-
sciousness is mentioned in the study given the activation of dif-
ferent brain regions, the activation of frontal cortex disappears
(Fig. 4B). By contrast, in agreement with lesion and stimulation
studies, reverse inference locates the best predictor of face per-
cepts in the right FFA (Fig. 4C,D). Content-specific results for
visual words or motion, speech sounds, or touch perception are
likewise regionalized to occipital, temporal, and parietal cortices.
In all these cases, reverse inference does not highlight frontal
areas as predictive for specific conscious contents.
Neurosynth also permits the assessment of the functional
specificity of brain areas at user-specified coordinates. For exam-
ple, activation in the FFA (with coordinate selected from the
statistical maximum of the traditional meta-analysis, [41, 49,
20]) is consistently predictive for faces (probability p 0.88),
temporo-occipital cortex for visual words ([46,54,12], p
0.86) or visual motion ([46,68, 0], p 0.9), superior temporal
cortex for speech sounds ([58,10, 0], p 0.84), and postcen-
tral cortex for touch ([54,22, 20], p 0.88). In contrast, the
statistical maximum within the frontal cortex activation obtained
from the traditional meta-analysis on consciousness (47, 6, 28)
is found to be most predictive for the terms “phonological” and
“task” (p 0.76 and p 0.63, respectively).
Prospective predictive approaches: decoding consciousness in
individual trials/subjects
Ideally, decoding approaches would identify the true NCC as
neural activity patterns most predictive for the presence of a given
conscious content (Sandberg et al., 2014). Unlike classical statis-
tical analysis, decoding approaches also assess reproducibility
as the percentage of accurate classification among single trials
(Haynes, 2009). With respect to the full NCC, the best predictors
for differentiating MCS from VS using PET or fMRI were located
in parietal, temporal, and occipital cortices (Demertzi et al., 2015;
Stender et al., 2016) (Fig. 5, top). An online prospective approach
based on EEG markers of arousal in posterior cortex was able to
predict consciousness (dreaming) versus unconsciousness dur-
ing NREM sleep with 85% accuracy (Siclari et al., 2017). Post hoc
analysis also located the areas most predictive for dreaming con-
sciousness within temporo-parieto-occipital cortices (Siclari et
al., 2017). Anesthesia studies have shown that frontal activity is a
poor predictor of consciousness (Avidan et al., 2011; Gaskell et
al., 2017), but there are no data so far for posterior cortex.
As for content-specific NCC, numerous studies in both awake
and dreaming subjects could decode the occurrence of specific
experiential contents from the activity of specific regions of pos-
terior cortex (Nishimoto et al., 2011; Horikawa et al., 2013; Siclari
et al., 2017). Working memory contents can also be decoded more
reliably from the back than from the front of the cortex (Emrich et
al., 2013) (Fig. 5, bottom). Finally, multivariate patterns predic-
tive of differences in subjective experiences both within (Krieges-
korte, 2011) and between subjects (Charest et al., 2014) are most
consistently found in posterior cortex.
Conclusion and future directions
In this Perspective, we have reviewed evidence across lesion,
stimulation, and recording studies that consistently point to re-
gions in the “back” of the cortex, including temporal, parietal,
and occipital areas, as a “posterior hot zone” that seems to play a
direct role in specifying the contents of consciousness. By con-
trast, evidence for a direct, content-specific involvement of the
“front” of the cortex, including most prefrontal regions, is miss-
ing or unclear. At a minimum, reports of conscious patients after
bilateral frontal lobectomy demonstrate that the prefrontal cor-
tex is not necessary for consciousness. Although most prefrontal
Figure4. Neuroimaging, Reverse inference.A,WhenusingNeurosynth for a traditionalmeta-analysis, computing theprobability that different brain regions are activewhen the topics of a study
include consciousness, parts of frontal cortex show up. B, When using Neurosynth in reverse inference mode, computing the probability that consciousness is included within the topics of a study,
given the activation of different parts of the brain, frontal cortex disappears. The key term “conscious” was used on the Neurosynth website to extract both “forward” meta-analysis and reverse
inference analysis steps in A,B. C, The same frontal areas that identified in a traditional meta-analysis for consciousness also appear activated in a traditional meta-analysis for faces.D, In contrast,
reverse inference for faces no longer identifies frontal cortex activity but rather locates the activation predicting highest probability for face percepts in the right FFA. The key term “faces” was used
on the Neurosynth website to extract both “forward” meta-analysis and reverse inference analysis steps in C, D. x, y, z values represent MNI coordinates, and a color scale is used for Z values.
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regions may be “mute” as regards to consciousness, not unlike
basal ganglia and cerebellum, it remains possible that some pre-
frontal regions, such as ventromedial areas (Koenigs et al., 2007)
or premotor areas, may contribute specific conscious contents,
such as feelings of reflection, valuation, and affect (Koch et al.,
2016b). Below we discuss some promising future research
directions.
Lesion studies
Lesion studies would benefit from a systematic assessment of loss
of specific conscious contents after frontal cortex damage, sam-
pling both task-related experiences as well as dream contents
(as in Solms, 2014). Future experiments should also investigate
possible dissociations between consciousness and cognitive func-
tions, such as attention and working memory after frontal dam-
age, detail the precise 3D location (as in Mah et al., 2014) and
laminar profile (Koch et al., 2016a) of the lesions, and control for
network effects (Fischer et al., 2016).
Stimulation studies
Stimulation studies should explore the effects of local pertur-
bations on both task performance (as in Winawer and Parvizi,
2016) and subjective experience, for example, using structured
questionnaires. Direct electrical stimulation combined with in-
tracranial recordings at the stimulation site and at distant sites
(as in Keller et al., 2014; Pigorini et al., 2015) should help to
identify specific patterns of functional connectivity involved in
consciousness.
Neuroimaging studies
Neuroimaging studies should further exploit within-state, no-
task paradigms to differentiate between the full NCC and neural
correlates of responsiveness (Koch et al., 2016a). With respect to
conscious content, pooling across an exhaustive set of different
experiments (as in Axelrod et al., 2015), including a formal com-
parison between them (Rutiku et al., 2016) and a combination of
report and no-report paradigms (Tsuchiya et al., 2016), should
help to identify content-specific NCC as the brain regions most
consistently activated in the presence of specific conscious per-
cepts. Systematic meta-analyses using reverse inference will be
useful to assess the reliability of NCC candidates while avoiding
cherry-picking (Moran and Zaki, 2013). Meta-analytic frame-
works, such as Neurosynth, should be modified by explicitly
incorporating the dissociation between consciousness and cogni-
tive functions, such as attention, working memory, and task ex-
Figure 5. Neuroimaging, Predictive approaches. Full NCC, Machine learning approaches applied to fMRI resting state show that temporo-parieto-occipital connectivity best differentiates
patients inMCS versus VS (Demertzi et al., 2015). Content-specific NCC, The contents of aworkingmemory task can best be decoded from the back of the brain (posterior green ROI, activated during
sample period), but not from the front of the brain (red fronto-parietal ROI, activated during delay period) (Emrich et al., 2013). Right side panel, Classification accuracy to identify conscious contents
ismuch higher for posterior Sample ROI than for fronto-parietal Delay ROI (left part of panel, before dashed line). Classification accuracy is also higher in occipital areas comparedwith parietal cortex
(right part of panel, after dashed line). IPS, Intraparietal sulcus; IOS, intraoccipital sulcus; MT, area MT; V1, primary visual cortex; V2, secondary visual cortex; ROI, region of interest.
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ecution. Prospective studies should confirm that the full NCC
identified through forward and reverse inferences remains the
best predictor for the presence of consciousness across different
physiological or pathological states, at the level of single trials, or
even online, in real time (as in Siclari et al., 2017). Decoding
studies should also explicitly compare the predictive value of dif-
ferent neural activity patterns for specific conscious contents (as
in Emrich et al., 2013). Finally, prospective studies should be used
to assess the clinical utility of different NCC candidates for de-
tecting consciousness in brain-damaged patients (as in Demertzi
et al., 2015; Stender et al., 2016).
Response from Dual Perspectives Companion
Authors–Brian Odegaard, Robert T. Knight,
and Hakwan Lau
Wewelcome the opportunity to address the issues raised by
Boly et al. Much of the basis of our disagreement with their
views has already been covered in our article. In essence, we
think it is misguided to downplay the role of the PFC in
conscious perception based on their selective review of the
literature.
Oneuseful point Boly et al. raised is thatwe should carefully
distinguish between different aspects of consciousness. In
the case of patients with large bilateral prefrontal lesions,
we argued that they lack consciousness in the sense of not
displaying goal-directed, meaningful interaction with objects
in the external world. But one may ask: do they specifically
have normal subjective perceptual experiences? Arguably, the
most challengingandconceptually importantquestionsabout
consciousness concern subjective experiences.
To clarify the issue, we included a video of such a patient.
Our point is that this question is difficult to address in a
decisive manner, given the inability of these lateral frontal
lesioned patients to provide meaningful responses to que-
ries. Notice also the striking difference compared with an-
other patient with extensive damage to the orbitofrontal
cortex, highlighting the regional differences in prefrontal
damage and conscious behavior.
Despite this difficulty, other evidence based on transcranial
magnetic stimulation (Rounis et al., 2010) and frontal le-
sions (Fleming et al., 2014) shows that such patients are
impaired in subjective perceptual experience.
We also want to reemphasize that patients with extensive
bilateral parieto-occipital damage with visual agnosias are
also conscious by the criteria of showing goal-directed ac-
tions toward the external world. This is not to say that these
regions are not critical for aspects of sensory perception, as
noted by Boly et al.
We think that this exchange is an important reminder that
data interpretation often depends on details. As such, we
are unsure about their suggestion that we can make use of
meta-analytic databases, such as Neurosynth, to definitively
settle these issues. In some areas of research, meta-analysis
is no doubt useful. But consciousness is an emerging field,
where discussion regarding, for example, what counts as an
appropriate experimental design, what existing measures
are valid, and how to control for confounds, is important.
A case inpoint is perhaps a recent studyby someof the same
authors as Boly et al. on EEG correlates of dreams (Siclari et
al., 2017). As pointed out in our article, a significant finding
emerged in PFC but was not emphasized, similar to other
examples in recent literature. A meta-analytic study may
well miss the positive prefrontal results because they were
not reported and highlighted as main findings by the au-
thors. Suchmeta-analytic approachesmayalsooverempha-
size neuroimaging methods with limited sensitivity.
Instead, we advocate the importance of continuing the
present kind of conversation in depth. Traditionally,
muchdiscussiononhumanconsciousness takes the formof
authoritative scholars advocating intriguing theories and
ideas, but placing relatively little emphasis on conflicting
data. Tomake true progress as a rigorous scientific field, we
need open and legitimate platforms, on which theoretical
viewpoints are critically scrutinized and evaluated from
multiple angles. The meetings for the Association for the
Scientific Studies of Consciousness provide excellent op-
portunities for us to continue these kind of debates, as well
as the opportunity to keep up to date with this burgeoning
and exciting literature.
Finally, Boly et al. cite 2 articles in their response (Schoen-
emann et al, 2005; Kennedy et al, 1998). Boly et al.’s conclu-
sion is that the non area 4 and 6 PFC is only 13% of the
cortical mantle. They fail to notice that the criteria for PFC
was tissue anterior to the genu of the corpus callosum. Sim-
ple inspection of Fig 1a in Schoenemann et al (2005) reveals
that this method severely underestimates PFC (note the lo-
cation of the central sulcus on the right of Fig 1a.) The true
percentage of non area 4 and 6 PFC is closer to 20–25% of
the cortical mantle.
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